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Foreign ownership and market power in banking: 
Evidence from a world sample 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The nexus between ownership and competition in the banking sector is a major concern to 
policymakers around the world but one that is rarely comprehensively examined. For 131 
countries and 13 years we match bank ownership with over 50,000 bank-year estimates of 
individual bank market power. We find that ownership does not explain market power at the 
individual bank level. However, at the country level, foreign bank ownership has a positive 
and significant impact on market power mainly because foreign banks enter through mergers 
or acquisitions and not through greenfield investments. The observed increases in market 
power primarily originate from decreases in the marginal cost. 
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1. Introduction 
Globalization is changing the nationality of ownership of firms around the world in many 
sectors, and the banking sector is no exception. Claessens and Van Horen (2014) for example 
report that the percentage of foreign banks present in a country increased from on average 
21% in 1995 to 35% in 2009, and that in certain developing countries this increase was even 
substantially higher. A first-order question that at once arises is how these changes in 
ownership affect market power in the local banking sector. To address this question we 
therefore construct a new data set that includes comprehensive bank-year estimates of market 
power of individual banks in most countries around the world and we study the effects of 
foreign bank ownership on our newly-constructed estimates of individual bank market power. 
Our paper addresses two crucial questions at once. First, we investigate if the 
ownership status, i.e., foreign or domestic, of individual banks affects their own market 
power. We call this the direct impact of (foreign) bank ownership. Theoretically, foreign 
banks could specialize in new and more specific products that are associated with higher 
prices and intermediation margins, or foreign banks could be the bearers of more cost-
effective production technologies, increasing the price-cost margins (a traditional measure of 
market power). These (and other similar) forces would yield higher price-cost margins for 
foreign-owned banks. However, foreign banks entering a new banking market might also face 
an informational disadvantage that would force them to price their products more 
competitively compared to the existing local banks, or be less cost effective for an initial 
period following their entry. So these forces would yield lower price-cost margins for 
foreign-owned banks. Therefore, the overall direct impact of foreign bank ownership on their 
market power is a priori ambiguous. 
Second, we analyze the extent to which changes in foreign bank presence at the 
country (and year) level has an impact on the market power of all individual banks (which 
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will comprise both foreign and domestic publicly listed banks). That is we consider whether a 
banking system with a higher foreign bank presence in general induces changes in individual 
bank market power. We call this the spillover effect. More intense foreign bank presence can 
trigger increased competition through the entry of new banks (greenfield entry), which leads 
to more competitive pricing of the banking products even for local banks (e.g., through a 
price war). However, the overall spillover effect of increased foreign bank presence on price-
cost margins could also be positive if foreign bank presence increases rapidly and higher cost 
efficiency does not materialize into more competitive pricing, especially given that foreign 
banks could monopoly price their new products.     
To empirically identify the direct impact and the spillover effect we adopt a two-step 
procedure. First, we estimate the individual market power of virtually all publicly listed 
banks in the world for which financial statements are available and comparable. For our 
analysis, we rely on both the Lerner index, which measures deviations of prices from 
marginal cost, and on the adjusted-Lerner index, which is similarly calculated but relaxes the 
assumption that banks function in a fully efficient manner. For the calculation of both indices 
we first estimate the marginal cost with a semiparametric technique that allows for greater 
flexibility in the production technology of banks compared to the extant parametric 
techniques. Thus, changes in the structure of the production technology across banks, 
countries and time are better accounted for. In this way we improve on the estimation of 
marginal cost and provide a new index of market power for the maximum amount of time and 
number of banking systems possible. We also examine the sensitivity of our results to the use 
of other commonly-used measures of market power (e.g., Lerner indices from other sources, 
the Boone indicator, etc.). 
In the second step, we examine the relative importance of the aforementioned direct 
impact and spillover effect. Using the database constructed by Claessens and van Horen 
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(2014) we classify all banks in our sample at each point in time as either domestic or foreign-
owned. Yet, despite the relevant and dynamic character of our ownership classification we 
fail to find − in any of the empirical exercises we do − a statistically significant (and/or 
economically relevant) direct effect of foreign ownership. It seems indeed there is no 
difference in market power between domestic and foreign-owned banks. 
Next, we aggregate foreign bank presence in each country and for each year. In this 
case, and even when controlling for the (seemingly irrelevant) direct impact, we find that 
higher foreign bank presence (at the country-year level) increases the market power of the 
average bank in the industry (whether it is domestic or foreign-owned) in a statistically 
significant and robust manner. This effect is also economically relevant. For example, an 
increase in foreign bank presence from 17% in 1997 to 25% in 2009 (which is the increase 
observed for the average country in our baseline specification) results in an increase in the 
Lerner index by 0.07 points (for the average Lerner index in our sample of 0.22 this is 
equivalent to a 32% increase). These findings are not sensitive to the use of alternative 
specifications for the estimation of the Lerner index and to other commonly used measures of 
market power (for example the measurement of market power with a country-level Lerner 
index or a Boone indicator). 
 We also analyze some theoretically plausible heterogeneous effects in the identified 
positive relation between foreign bank presence and market power. We show that the positive 
effect of foreign bank presence on banks’ market power is primarily due to their entry 
through a merger or acquisition rather than through a greenfield investment. Indeed, in our 
sample, two out of three foreign banks are established in the host country through a merger or 
acquisition and this is seemingly the main channel leading to the positive spillover effect of 
foreign bank presence on banks` market power. 
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 In addition, we find that the positive spillover effect of foreign bank ownership on the 
Lerner index is mainly due to the resultant lower marginal cost. In contrast, foreign bank 
presence does not have a statistically significant effect on the price component of the Lerner 
index, although this effect per se does contribute to the strong impact of foreign bank 
presence on the margin (gap) between price and marginal cost (and naturally on the Lerner 
index itself). Thus, higher foreign bank presence in a country increases the market power of 
banks by directly affecting the gap between output prices and marginal cost mainly through 
increases in the cost efficiency across banks. Importantly, this result is driven by the mode of 
foreign bank entry. 
Our study is the first to investigate if and by how much foreign bank ownership 
affects individual bank market power, across certain bank and industry characteristics that 
may affect the relative importance of this effect. Our finding on the positive spillover effect 
contrasts with the only two existing empirical studies on this issue. Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) study a cross-sectional sample of 50 countries (with market power estimates averaged 
over the period 1994-2001) and Jeon, Olivero, and Wu (2011) study a country-year panel for 
the period 1997-2008 of Asian and Latin American countries. Both analyze the impact of 
foreign bank presence on bank competition at the country (and year) level. Both studies find a 
negative (positive) relation between foreign ownership and market power (competition). 
There are a number of differentiating characteristics of our study vis-à-vis theirs that 
may help explain our unique findings. Most importantly based on our own estimates of 
individual bank market power and the foreign ownership data collected by Claessens and van 
Horen (2014) we can analyze the impact of a bank-level market power variable for a sample 
covering 131 countries over the period 1997 to 2009 (which compared to all existing studies 
guarantees us the broadest coverage). In contrast, existing studies focus on the relation 
between foreign bank entry and market power (competition) at the country or country-year 
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level for a more limited number of countries. We take a number of steps (including the 
replication of the results of both previous studies) to show that level of the analysis and the 
sample coverage are the main reasons behind our finding of a positive correspondence 
between foreign bank presence at the country level and market power at the bank level. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
arguments linking foreign bank ownership with bank market power and the explicit paths that 
can influence this relation. Section 3 discusses the data set on the banks’ market power along 
with the way this is estimated, and also provides definitions and information on the foreign 
bank ownership and the control variables. Section 4 discusses the empirical identification 
procedure and the estimation results. Section 5 summarizes the results and provides policy 
implications. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations and related literature 
There are two main channels through which foreign bank ownership may affect bank market 
power. First, foreign banks may have different levels of market power compared to domestic 
banks. We call this the direct impact of foreign ownership on market power. The second 
effect is related to the fact that foreign bank presence in the banking industry as a whole can 
cause changes to banks’ market power, both domestic and foreign. We call this the spillover 
effect of foreign bank presence on bank market power. We analyze the two effects by 
emphasizing their sources, as these are related to the pricing of banking products or to their 
marginal cost. Both prices and costs may change due to the direct impact and the spillover 
effect, hence the price-cost margin (Lerner index), which is a common measure of market 
power, may be changing accordingly. 
It is not a priori obvious whether the direct impact will be positive or negative. On the 
one hand, foreign banks have access to alternative sources of funds through their affiliates in 
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their country of origin and could bring in more specialized and sophisticated banking 
products that are monopolistically priced. Furthermore, these banks are usually more cost-
efficient (Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel, 2005; Degryse, Havrylchyk, Jurzyk, and Kozak, 2012), 
as they have access to better technology, especially if their country of origin has a more 
developed banking sector compared to the one they penetrate (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Huizinga, 2001; Micco, Panizza, and Yan, 2007). On the other hand, foreign banks 
entering a new market may face an informational handicap (Bofondi and Gobbi, 2006; 
Gormley, 2010), at least in the initial period following their entry, that could force them to 
price their products more competitively so that they offer better loan terms to attract 
customers from existing banks (Sengupta, 2007).
1
 Such behavior would result in a lower 
price-cost margin. 
The direction of the spillover effect is again a priori ambiguous. Foreign bank entry 
can stimulate competition in domestic markets in general and put downward pressure on 
prices (Levine, 1996; Beck, Ioannidou, and Schafer, 2012). This effect is likely to be 
particularly strong in the case of greenfield entry, which adds competitors, and less so in the 
case of acquisitions, where a foreign bank takes over an existing domestic bank. However, 
there are also forces leading to a positive relation between foreign bank presence and bank 
market power. First, if the efficiency advantage of foreign banks forces domestic banks to 
become more efficient themselves, this could lead to higher margins for all banks if the cost 
savings are not passed on through lower prices. The same effect could arise if foreign banks 
are able to exploit their superior know-how and come to dominate domestic markets in new 
innovative financial products. If this is accompanied by a large scale and rapid penetration of 
foreign banking, this mechanism will naturally result to a monopolistic behavior of many 
                                                 
1
 Bofondi and Gobbi (2006) suggest that domestic banks have informational advantage with respect to their own 
costumers and the overall economic conditions of the local credit market. 
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banks in the industry and the loss of competitive pricing of the monopolistic products, at least 
for some period of time. 
Clearly, the nexus between foreign bank ownership and market power could be 
affected by a number of bank- and market-specific characteristics. At the bank level, a 
comparative advantage of the foreign banks usually comes from their access to capital from 
their parent companies in the origin country. Given that capital requirements are now in place 
in virtually all countries, this advantage of foreign banks can translate into a lower cost of 
capital and improved efficiency. However, if the capital market in the domestic banking 
system is deep and domestic banks are well-capitalized, this will weaken the implied positive 
relation between foreign ownership and market power. The opposite effect could prevail if 
there is a big difference between foreign and domestic banks in the way they finance their 
own lending. Usually, domestic banks have established long-term relationships with their 
depositors and they tend to have higher deposits to assets ratios. In contrast, foreign banks 
have access to potentially less expensive liquid funds from their parent companies or the 
international interbank market. 
As discussed above, a natural differentiating factor in the impact of foreign ownership 
on competition is the mode of foreign bank entry. Greenfield entry increases the number of 
banks in the domestic banking industry, which by itself promotes competition, while 
penetration through an acquisition leaves the number of banks unchanged (Martinez Peria 
and Mody, 2004). Van Tassel and Vishwasrao (2007) and Claeys and Hainz (2014) further 
highlight that a foreign bank enters through a greenfield investment only if its advantage in 
screening new applicant firms, due to e.g. better screening technology, compensates its 
disadvantage of having no information about incumbent firms. If a foreign bank enters via an 
acquisition, it acquires a credit portfolio that contains information about the quality of 
incumbent firms. In addition, the acquired bank can generate information by screening 
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applicants and this generates an informational advantage for foreign banks entering via 
acquisitions. The mode of entry, thus, determines the distribution of information between 
foreign and domestic banks, which affects the degree of competition in the banking industry. 
The empirical evidence on the influence of the mode of entry on various aspects of 
banking is substantial. For example, in Mexico during the so-called tequila crisis, foreign 
banks entered almost entirely through the acquisition of existing domestic banks, thus 
preserving the oligopolistic structure of the industry (Moguillansky, Stuart, and Vergara, 
2004). Also, Havrylchyk (2006) shows that Polish banks acquired by foreign banks do not 
show improvements in efficiency, whereas greenfield entrants tend to be more efficient than 
their domestic counterparts. Similarly, Peek, Rosengren, and Kasirye (1999) find that foreign 
banks entering the US market tend to acquire poor-performing institutions and that the 
performance of these institutions does not substantially improve post-acquisition. Finally, 
Lehner (2009) suggests that greenfield entry occurs mainly in developed countries, whereas 
in less developed countries entry by acquisition is more prevalent. 
The relation between market power and foreign ownership can also be affected by a 
number of characteristics of the banking industry. Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga 
(2001) show that foreign banks have lower interest margins, overhead expenses, and 
profitability than domestic banks in developed countries, whereas the opposite is true in 
developing countries. Similarly, Lensink and Hermes (2004) find that foreign bank entry into 
less developed countries leads to higher costs and margins for the local banks, and Micco, 
Panizza, and Yan (2007) that foreign-owned banks in developing countries are more cost-
efficient than private local banks. These studies suggest that the reasons for foreign entry, as 
well as the competitive and regulatory conditions found abroad, might differ significantly 
between developed and developing countries. 
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Besides the two papers that are directly relevant to our work (Claessens and Laeven, 
2004; Jeon, Olivero, and Wu, 2011), our study is also related to two large, but rather separate, 
literatures: one on foreign bank participation and one on banking competition and market 
power. Claessens (2006) reviews and refines the full set of arguments linking the two 
literatures and identifies the limitations of the existing empirical evidence. Among other 
studies, Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez (2003), Beck, Ioannidou, and Schafer 
(2012) and Bruno and Hauswald (2013), find that foreign bank entry improves credit 
conditions for enterprises of all sizes, and Berger, Hasan, and Klapper (2004) suggest that a 
larger foreign bank presence leads to a greater availability of credit to SMEs (see also 
Giannetti and Ongena, 2009, 2012). 
Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008), Beck and Martinez Peria (2010), Gormley 
(2010), and Balmaceda, Fischer, and Ramirez (2014) offer a less positive view of foreign 
bank participation by highlighting that foreign banks tend to select borrowers with greater 
creditworthiness (“cherry pick”), while domestic banks are left with lower quality borrowers. 
This, in turn can hurt the profitability of the domestic banks and their willingness to lend. 
Empirical research on the relative performance of domestic and foreign banks has produced 
contradictory results, with some studies finding that foreign banks do better and other studies 
reporting stronger performance of domestic banks; see Degryse and Ongena (2008) and Chen 
and Liao (2011) for reviews of this evidence. 
 
3. Variables and data 
The empirical model we use to study the relation between foreign bank ownership and bank 
market power is of the following form: 
Litc = δ0 + δ1 Li,t-1,c + φ FOi,t-1,c + θ FPt-1,c + δ2 Bitc + δ3 Xt-1,c + εitc .   (1) 
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In equation (1) the market power L of bank i at year t and country c is regressed on its annual 
lag, a dummy variable foreign-owned (FO) that is observed at the bank-country-year level 
and takes the value one when a bank is foreign-owned and zero otherwise, an indicator 
foreign presence (FP) that is observed at the country-year level and measures the extent of 
foreign bank presence,
2
 a vector of bank characteristics B observed at the bank-year level, 
and a vector of variables X observed at the country-year level. εitc is the stochastic 
disturbance. 
 Foreign-owned and foreign presence enter equation (1) with a one-year lag in our 
baseline specifications, and the same holds for all the variables observed at the country-year 
level. This timing is derived from the fact that country-level changes, like structural, 
regulatory, and macroeconomic developments, take time to reach the market and have a 
bearing on the market power of individual banks. In addition, modelling our two foreign 
ownership variables in this way mitigates the endogeneity problem stemming from reverse 
causality. In contrast, all the bank-level control variables B enter equation (1) 
contemporaneously. These variables have a direct and contemporaneous bearing on the cost 
structure and the pricing decisions of banks, as they describe individual bank strategies that 
can change in the short-term. 
Our final data set includes bank-level data from 131 countries and spans the period 
1997-2009 (due to the availability of data for foreign bank ownership). The rest of this 
section discusses our measures of bank market power, the foreign ownership variables and 
the control variables used in our study. The correlation coefficients between the explanatory 
variables that were used as determinants of bank market power do not give rise to any 
multicollinearity concerns (further left unreported). In Table 1 we provide detailed definitions 
                                                 
2
 Given that the correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.50, we check whether our estimates suffer 
from multicollinearity problems. However, the variance inflation and other tests for collinearity imply that this 
is not the case and that an analysis including both variables is statistically meaningful. 
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for the variables used to estimate equation (1) and in Table 2 we report summary statistics for 
these variables. 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
3.1. Measures of market power 
The measurement of market power has received much attention in the economics literature 
since the importance of imperfectly competitive markets was first recognized in the 1930s. 
The Lerner index (1934) remains to this day a popular measure of market power (and of 
competition) thanks to its simplicity and transparency. It is defined as: 
,itc itcitc
itc
P MC
L
P

           (2) 
where P and MC are the price of bank output and the marginal cost of the production of this 
output. The Lerner index ranges between zero and one, with zero corresponding to perfect 
competition and larger values reflecting more market power (and less competition). The 
index can also be negative if P < MC, which is of course not sustainable in the long run. 
The Lerner index measures departures from the competitive benchmark of marginal 
cost pricing. This makes it a simple and intuitively appealing index of market power. The 
index has also often been used as a measure of competition. Although the link between 
market power and competition might seem obvious, it has been shown that the Lerner index 
does not always point in the expected direction when competitive conditions change (Stiglitz, 
1989; Boone, 2008). For this reason we interpret the Lerner index as primarily a measure of 
market power, with a further connection to competition a natural but not entirely 
uncontroversial possibility. 
Alternative measures of market power and competition include the H-statistic (Panzar 
and Rosse 1987) and the profit elasticity (Griffith, Boone, and Harrison, 2005). The H-
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statistic has been widely used in banking studies, but has a shortcoming when it is used as a 
continuous measure of market power. As Bikker, Shaffer, and Spierdijk (2012) point out, the 
H-statistic maps the various degrees of market power only weakly and thus cannot be viewed 
as a continuous variable. The profit elasticity (or Boone indicator) is a relatively new concept 
that has been used in several recent studies but has also received some criticism. For 
example, Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke (2010) show that it makes critical assumptions 
relative to firm size and to market definition. 
Given that the alternative indices of market power and competition are still open to 
some critique, we favor the Lerner index and its variants as our proxy for market power. 
However, we also employ as robustness checks the H-statistic and the Boone indicator. The 
main reason for our choice is that the Lerner index allows for variation at the bank level. This 
advantage increases the richness of our empirical analysis as it allows us to study both the 
direct impact and the spillover effect of foreign bank ownership and presence. Also, as Beck, 
De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013) readily argue, the Lerner index is a good proxy for current 
and future proﬁts stemming from pricing power, while it is not constrained by the extent of 
the market. In contrast, other bank-level measures, such as the market share or Tobin’s q, can 
lead to larger measurement error because they also capture to a greater extent the rents 
extracted from being too-big-to-fail.
3
 Moreover, the Lerner index captures both the impact of 
pricing power on the asset side of the banks’ balance sheet and the elements associated with 
the cost efficiency on their liability side. 
Computation of the Lerner index requires knowledge of the marginal cost. When such 
information is unavailable (as in most empirical data sets), the marginal cost can be estimated 
using econometric methods. A popular approach has been to estimate a translog cost function 
and take its derivative to obtain the marginal cost. Some recent work has shown that it is 
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possible to improve on this methodology with semiparametric or nonparametric methods that 
allow for more flexibility in the functional form (McAllister and McManus, 1993; Delis, 
Iosifidi, and Tsionas, 2014). We follow this new literature and estimate the cost function 
using a partial linear smooth coefficient (PLSC) model. We provide all the details for the 
estimation of marginal cost and the data cleaning process in online Appendix A and here we 
just outline the advantages of this approach.
4
 
Most importantly, the semiparametric nature of the method implies that no 
assumption regarding the functional form of the cost equation is made globally. An 
assumption is just made “in local neighborhoods of observations.” This is important as it is 
usually quite difficult for the researcher to be certain about the validity of the chosen 
functional form. In their survey paper, Reiss and Wolak (2007) are very skeptical about using 
a specific functional form to estimate a cost equation without a prior analysis of the data, 
since an “incorrect” cost equation can bias the estimation and inference of marginal cost in an 
unknown direction and with an unknown magnitude. The flexibility of the semiparametric 
technique also allows using large international samples of banks from different countries, 
without being concerned that certain banking markets in different countries or banks within 
the same country face or adopt different production technologies. Hence, this approach takes 
into account the heterogeneity in the production technology across banks, countries, and time. 
Delis (2012), Wheelock and Wilson (2012), and Delis, Iosifidi and Tsionas (2014) show that 
estimation of marginal cost using semiparametric and nonparametric methods produces 
significantly better results (in terms of lower bias) than parametric techniques and commonly 
used functional forms like the translog. 
                                                                                                                                                        
3
 Even though to a lesser extent, this can also be the case for the Lerner index, in light of governments’ policies 
towards too-big-to-fail banks, especially during times of financial turmoil. 
4
 We check the robustness of our results by using the translog model. We find some deviations in our results that 
are in line with the study of Delis, Iosifidi, and Tsionas (2014). However, our main results on the effect of 
foreign bank presence on bank market power are qualitatively similar. 
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The data used for the estimation of the Lerner index are from Bankscope and require 
an advanced cleaning process to avoid including duplicates in our sample. This literally 
involves examining each bank one by one and in many instances collecting information from 
the banks’ websites, for example to examine the history of bank operation and ownership, the 
existence of subsidiaries with the same names with the parent bank, and the occurrence of 
M&As during our sample period. We provide all the details of this intensive data collection 
and processing in online Appendix A. 
We also use two variants of the traditional Lerner index. The first is the efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index, which takes the form:  
. = ,itc itc itc itcitc
itc itc
TC MC Q
adj Lerner
TC
   

 
      (3) 
where Π is the banks’ profit and Q is the banks’ output, measured by the banks’ total earning 
assets. This index allows for the possibility that firms do not choose the prices and input levels 
in a profit-maximizing way. For the estimation of this index we use the exact same procedure 
as Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012). 
The second variant of the Lerner index adopts a dual-output cost function. 
Specifically, many banks have a significant volume of off-balance sheet items that can be 
considered as a distinct output besides the total earning assets that are used as our main 
output. The off-balance sheet items are produced using essentially the same inputs with the 
single-output model of the bank and, thus, the single-output model may be missing some 
important information. For the estimated dual-output cost function and its derivative, see 
online Appendix A. 
In online Appendix B, we report the weighted mean values of the estimated Lerner 
index by country and year, with market shares as the weights. The equivalent estimates for 
the adjusted-Lerner index and the dual-output Lerner index are available on request. These 
values are effectively a new worldwide index of banking-sector competition, with larger 
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coverage compared to existing literature. The weighted mean values are 0.27, 0.17, and 0.22 
for the Lerner index, the adjusted-Lerner index, and the Lerner index with two outputs, 
respectively. The Lerner index ranges between -0.12 in Ecuador in 1998 and 0.82 (close to 
monopoly) in Cuba in 1997. The adjusted-Lerner index ranges between -0.18 in Paraguay in 
2002 and 0.82 in Cuba in 1997. We omit the discussion for the Lerner index for the two-
output case, as the results on this index are very similar to the other two Lerner indices.
5
 
In Figure 1 we show the time trend in average bank competition for each of the three 
indices. In broad terms, all indices identify similar trends in competition for the 148 
economies over time. More precisely, average bank market power peaks in 2003-2004, 
declines in the period 2007-2008, and increases again in 2009 and 2010. This pattern may 
reflect the sharp increase in financial globalization before the financial crisis of 2007 and 
related reforms that are likely to have led to higher market power through cross-border 
M&A’s and increased efficiency, without an accompanying reduction in the lending rate. 
Evidently, the start of the global financial crisis coincides with a decrease in the market 
power. This may be related to capital losses and non-performing loans suffered by many 
banks, which reduced efficiency, or to the rising informational asymmetry costs faced by 
banks during crises (e.g., adverse selection and moral hazard) that sharply increase the real 
cost of lending. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3.2. Foreign bank ownership 
                                                 
5
 Our country-averages for the Lerner index are very close to the equivalent from the World Bank (overall 
averages are 0.22 and 0.21, respectively). Even though there are some relatively minor differences between the 
countries, the correlation coefficient between the two is as high as 0.67. Most countries with high (low) Lerner 
indices based on our estimates also have high (low) Lerner indices in the respective indices of the World Bank. 
Sensitivity analysis using the World Bank estimates confirms the main findings of our study. 
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Information for foreign bank ownership is from the database of Claessens and van Horen 
(2014). As we follow their approach in our own data processing to estimate bank market 
power, we have an almost identical sample of banks that we identify as foreign or domestic 
owned. Foreign-owned banks are identified as those with 50% or more of their shares owned 
by foreigners and we use this information to construct the foreign-owned dummy variable. 
This variable identifies the direct effect of foreign ownership on the market power of 
individual banks. 
For the country-level foreign presence, Claessens and van Horen (2014) construct two 
indices. The first index is defined as the percentage of foreign banks among total banks in a 
country (foreign presence) and covers the period 1995 to 2009. The second is defined as the 
percentage of foreign bank assets among total bank assets (foreign presence in terms of 
assets). Even though the second index can be argued to describe foreign bank presence 
somewhat better, it is only available for the 2004-2009 period because of missing information 
on bank assets for a large number of banks before 2004. The correlation coefficient between 
the two indices for the period 2004-2009 is as high as 81.1%. Thus, the large time span of the 
data set makes the use of the first index optimal for our study, whereas the index based on the 
market share of foreign banks is used in a sensitivity analysis. 
By using foreign presence in the same equation with foreign-owned we are able to 
identify the separate impact of the two on banks’ market power. Figure 2 presents a scatter 
plot of the Lerner index against foreign presence and the associated regression line. The 
regression line has a positive slope that is statistically significant at the 1% level. It remains 
to be examined whether this relation continues to hold when controlling for foreign-owned 
and whether it can be interpreted as causal. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
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3.3. Control variables 
Consistent with previous studies, we include several control variables that are drawn from the 
literature on the determinants of bank competition to rule out other possible explanations for 
our results (e.g., Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; 
Delis, 2012). The bank-specific variables (indicated as Bitc in equation 1) include: the ratio of 
customer deposits to total assets (termed deposits) to control for the level of bank deposits 
supporting total assets; the ratio of the book value of equity capital to total assets 
(capitalization) to control for bank capitalization; the ratio of loans to total assets (loans) to 
control for bank specialization (also used as a crude measure of liquidity); and the natural 
logarithm of real total assets (bank size) to measure bank size. Delis (2012) shows that well-
capitalized and larger banks are able to set higher margins or to have access to cheaper 
sources of funds due to scale economies and lower informational asymmetries. In contrast, a 
higher deposits ratio implies higher cost of intermediated funds and, thus, lower market 
power (especially in normal economic periods). In turn, loans is a measure of bank 
specialization, with a higher ratio relating to banks that focus on the traditional activity of 
credit provision. 
We additionally assess the robustness of our results to the use of other measures of 
bank liquidity (liquid assets divided by total assets) and credit risk (non-performing loans 
divided by total loans or loan loss provisions divided by total loans), but we did not find 
significant changes in our results. It should be noted that the sample is smaller when 
including the last two variables, due to missing data, and that the definition of liquid assets in 
Bankscope sometimes differs across countries. 
For the country-level characteristics we use a wide set of structural, regulatory, 
institutional, and macroeconomic variables. First, we use the entry restrictions index, which 
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measures the degree to which all banks in a country face entry barriers. We construct this 
index using information from the studies of Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008), Cihak, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2012), and previous versions of 
the former study (henceforth jointly indicated as BCL2008; details are provided in Table 1). 
This index takes a value from zero to 12, with larger values denoting more stringent entry 
restrictions. 
We also use the relative share of privately owned banks vs. that of the publicly owned 
banks (constructed in terms of deposits). This allows avoiding to falsely attribute the impact 
of foreign bank ownership (which usually corresponds to private ownership), to the 
associated impact of private ownership on banks’ market power. We note that poorer 
countries are associated with higher levels of public ownership of banks, which is consistent 
with the findings of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). Further, we use the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is defined as the ratio of the sum of squared market 
shares of each bank in the industry. Market concentration measures, such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, have been considered in the past as measures of competition (Cetorelli and 
Strahan, 2006). There is now consensus that these indices are not accurate proxies of 
competition but they are nonetheless useful control variables as they reflect important 
industry characteristics (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 
2006). 
Another important set of characteristics that can potentially influence the relation 
between market power and foreign bank ownership relates to the regulatory framework in 
which banks operate (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006). 
We use three indices obtained (once more) from BCL2008. These indices represent activity 
restrictions, capital requirements, and supervisory power. Explicit definitions of these indices 
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are provided in Table 1. For a literature review of the relation between bank competition and 
regulation, see for example Degryse and Ongena (2008). 
Moreover, we control for the impact of the macroeconomic environment common to 
all banks that can potentially affect competitive conditions. We use the share of the 
manufacturing sector relative to GDP (manufacturing) and the net inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) suggest that the manufacturing sector is 
highly bank-dependent and the conditions in this industry can affect the market power of 
banks through both demand and supply forces. Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez 
(2003) provide evidence suggesting that foreign banks follow their clients abroad. Thus, the 
effect of foreign bank ownership on the banks’ market power might be overestimated when 
the net inflow of FDI and manufacturing are excluded from the analysis. 
In addition, we use information from the Heritage foundation on the size of the public 
sector, as measured by the ratio of government spending to GDP (government spending). 
Following the reasoning of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), countries with a 
larger public sector are relatively inefficient, governments are interventionist, and protection 
of property rights is poor. Thus, we could observe a positive link between this measure of 
government size and banks’ market power. 
Along the same lines, we use the financial freedom index and the trade freedom index 
from the Heritage foundation. The financial freedom index measures independence from 
government control and interference in the financial sector. Higher values for this index 
reflect greater financial liberalization.
6
 The trade freedom index is a composite measure of 
the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and 
services, with higher values indicating more freedom to trade internationally. 
                                                 
6
 An alternative index has been constructed by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) but its coverage ends in 
2005. 
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We also control for the prevailing political ideology and freedom using the ideology 
of chief executives variable (left, center, or right) from Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and 
Walsh (2001) (updated until 2012) and the polity variable from the Polity IV project, 
respectively. These two variables are potentially important in explaining the competitive 
conditions in the banking sector, because banks operating in more democratic and more 
rightwing countries will have fewer restrictions that might not be captured by our regulatory 
variables. Finally, we control for the level of economic development by including the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita, taken from the World Bank Indicators.
7
 
 
4. Foreign bank ownership and market power: Identification and results 
4.1. Empirical identification 
Two important identification problems are the dynamic nature of bank market power and the 
potential endogeneity of the foreign ownership variables. Concerning the former, Berger, 
Bonime, Covitz, and Hancock (2000) and Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson (2004) suggest 
that even developed banking markets might be characterized by information opacity, 
networking, and relationship-lending, all of which impede competition. These elements cause 
persistence in the cost structure, profitability, and market power of banks. 
To account for these dynamics we include the first and/ or the second lag of the 
dependent variable among the regressors and use the GMM estimators for dynamic panels of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In our analysis we use the two-step 
“difference” GMM estimator with robust standard errors corrected using the method of 
Windmeijer (2005).
8
 The consistency of the GMM estimator depends both on the assumption 
                                                 
7
 We exhaustively control with more than two hundred other variables taken from various databases. But we do 
not find any significant changes in the main results we report here. We therefore think our estimates are 
conservatively robust. 
8
 We prefer the so-called “difference” over the “system” GMM estimator because the results on the specification 
tests (i.e., the Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions and tests for serial correlation of the error terms) are 
better under the former method. Specifically, we find that the lagged differences used as instruments under the 
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of the validity of the instruments and on the assumption that the error term does not exhibit 
serial correlation. To this end, we use two tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to 
evaluate these assumptions. The first is the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
tests the overall strength of the instruments. The second test examines the assumption of no 
serial correlation in the error terms. 
Note that the error term obtained from the estimation of equation (1) is likely to be 
serially correlated due to the fact that the dependent variable is observed at the bank-country-
year level and some of the explanatory variables are observed at the country-year level. This 
problem is comprehensively analyzed by Moulton (1990). Thus, estimation is carried out 
using standard errors clustered by country. We also experiment with country-specific year 
effects, but this increases the number of instruments in the GMM procedure asymptotically 
and causes the Hansen test to be equal to unity. 
In estimating equation (1), endogeneity of the two foreign ownership variables can 
arise both from reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Reverse causality could emerge 
from the preference of foreign-owned banks to enter with monopolistic products with high 
markups, so as to generate higher profits. In addition, it can arise if foreign banks acquire 
banks that already possess market power and continue similar practices. However, the 
monopolistic product explanation is more likely in our sample, given that the mean market 
power of the acquired banks (0.203) is on average lower than that of the non-acquired 
domestic banks (0.218). To alleviate these concerns of reverse causality, all the right-hand 
side variables except the bank characteristics are lagged once. This is intuitive both 
statistically and theoretically. From a statistical viewpoint, the literature commonly (e.g., 
recently Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013) employs lagged explanatory variables to 
mitigate endogeneity issues that emerge due to reverse causality. On the theoretical side, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
system GMM procedure are rather poor instrumental variables. For a similar application of GMM in the banking 
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banks are aware of their main balance-sheet characteristics when deciding on their cost 
structure and pricing policy (i.e., the components of the Lerner index). 
In turn, the omitted variable bias could arise because there are some unobservable 
reasons affecting banks’ market power and these may correlate with the choice of a bank to 
enter into a specific market (e.g., specific unobserved elements of the tax system, ability to 
carry out profit shifting and/or portfolio diversification). We assuage the omitted variable 
bias by using an IV-style instrumental variable. Specifically, we use the entry restrictions for 
foreign banks (ERFB) lagged once as an IV-style instrument. We construct this index with 
information from BCL2008 (see again Table 1 for details). This index ranges between zero 
and four inclusive, with higher values reflecting higher entry restrictions for foreign banks. 
We identify the two endogenous variables by using both ERFBt-1 and ERFBt-2 as IV-style 
instruments. 
Naturally, the entry restrictions for foreign banks affect foreign bank ownership and 
presence in each country: we hypothesize that foreign bank presence must be lower in 
countries with significant protection of the domestic banking sector. Further, it seems 
unlikely that these restrictions affect banks’ market power directly. The only way that ERFB 
could be correlated with the Lerner indices is through common regulatory, institutional, and 
macroeconomic developments that tend to move together. However, as discussed in Section 
3.3, in our empirical analysis we control for a number of such variables, and most importantly 
for the general entry restrictions common to all banks, foreign-owned or not. Thus, we 
distinguish between entry restrictions for foreign banks and general entry restrictions. We 
also control for year fixed effects, and other regulatory, macroeconomic, institutional, and 
political variables.
9
 
                                                                                                                                                        
industry, see Bruno and Hauswald (2013). 
9
 In online Appendix D we run additional tests for the validity of the ERFB variable as an instrument as follows. 
First, we regress, using the fixed effects model, the two foreign ownership variables on the ERFB variable plus 
controls and we find that ERFB is negative and strongly statistically significant. Also, we regress, again with the 
 23 
Some of the control variables can also be considered as endogenous in equation (1) 
due to an omitted variable bias. Not recognizing these variables as such can bias the 
coefficient on the foreign ownership variable. GMM allows treating these variables as 
endogenous using lags of the instrumented variables as instruments (Bond, 2002; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Roodman, 2009). We adopt this strategy despite its 
imperfections because finding solely economically motivated instruments for all potential 
endogenous control variables would be challenging. We choose the lag-length of these 
instruments on the basis of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. 
In light of the above, the full set of the instrumental variables in the baseline 
specification includes the contemporaneous and the first lag of the entry restrictions for 
foreign banks as IV-style instruments, and, as GMM-style instruments, the third lag of the 
dependent variable, the first lags of the bank-specific control variables and the second to 
fourth lags of entry restrictions. In the specifications with additional controls we also add the 
second lags of these control variables as GMM-style instruments. Use of these instruments 
yields Hansen tests for both the overall and IV-style instruments that do not reject the null of 
overidentifying restrictions. We also  examine the sensitivity of our results with even fewer 
instruments to avoid the too-many instruments problem highlighted by Roodman (2009). Our 
results are essentially unchanged. We also confirm, using the second-order autocorrelation 
test (reported as AR2), that our estimated equations do not suffer from serial correlation. 
 
4.2. Baseline results 
In Table 3 we report the baseline results from the estimation of equation (1). The Hansen 
tests (overall and IV-style) show that the estimated equations are not overidentified and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
fixed effects model, the market power variables on the ERFB plus the same controls and we find that ERFB is 
statistically insignificant. 
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AR2 test that there is no second-order autocorrelation. As expected, the values of the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable indicate that market power is quite persistent. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The specifications in Table 3 include different measures of market power. In column I 
we use the most basic Lerner index and we find that the coefficient of foreign-owned is 
statistically insignificant. This result shows that the average foreign bank in our sample does 
not have a significantly higher Lerner index compared to the average domestically owned 
bank. In contrast, foreign presence has a positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level) 
effect on the Lerner index. This effect is also economically significant. For example, an 
increase in foreign bank presence by 8%p (percentage points) from 17% in 1997 to 25% in 
2009 (which is the increase observed for the average country in our baseline specification) 
resulted in an increase in the Lerner index of 0.07 points (for the average Lerner index in our 
sample of 0.22 this is equivalent to a 32% increase). Considering that the standard deviation 
of foreign presence is 17%p and the trend on this variable is indeed increasing, it seems that 
the share of foreign banks is a very important explanatory factor of the bank-level markups. 
In column II we assess the inclusion of foreign presence in terms of assets to examine 
the spillover effect (instead of foreign presence). The coefficient on this variable is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The economic significance however is lower 
compared to foreign presence. This is expected because the assets-based variable 
incorporates the element that foreign banks can also be partially owned by domestic owners, 
whereas foreign presence characterizes foreign banks entirely as foreign-owned or not. Still a 
10%p increase in foreign bank ownership in terms of assets will increase the Lerner index by 
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0.03. For the bank in our sample with an average Lerner index this implies an 13.6% increase 
in the Lerner index. 
In columns III and IV we carry out the same analysis by using Lerner indices obtained 
when capitalization is included in the cost function and when, in addition to the inclusion of 
capitalization, the cost function also includes country fixed effects. Compared to column I, 
the results from both specifications remain practically unaffected. In columns V and VI we 
further experiment with the adjusted-Lerner and the dual-output Lerner indices and we still 
find that the only statistically significant ownership variable is foreign presence. These 
results also hold when we use the country-year average of the Lerner index (column VII) , the 
translog-based country-year average Lerner index from the World Bank (column VIII), and 
the country-year Boone indicator from the World Bank (column IX). In contrast, the results 
are inferior when we use the H-statistic, either at the bank-level as in column X or at the 
country-year level as in column XI.
10
 
The implications of these results are then straightforward. The ownership status, 
foreign or domestic, of individual banks seems to play no role in explaining banks’ market 
power. Thus, we can rule out a significant direct effect of foreign-owned on bank market 
power, but we do find a positive and significant spillover effect of foreign presence on bank 
markups. 
The effect of the control variables is in line with expectations and with previous 
studies. For example, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) find that higher entry restrictions in 
banking markets are associated with a greater ability for the banks to charge a price above its 
marginal cost. In our sample we identify the same effect through the entry restrictions 
variable. We also find that well-capitalized banks are those possessing higher market power, 
                                                 
10
 The inferior findings on the regressions including the H-statistic compared to the rest of the specifications on 
the Lerner and Boone indices may reflect the fact that from the three measures of market power, the H-statistic 
is the only one that does not robustly map the various degrees of market power (e.g., Bikker, Shaffer, and 
Spierdijk, 2012). 
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which can be attributed to their ability to raise capital more easily and perhaps more 
inexpensively. In contrast, banks with higher deposits have lower market power in some of 
our baseline specifications. This is consistent with the fact that the higher cost of deposits 
relative to other sources of bank funds, implies lower market power, probably because the 
marginal cost is higher. 
We also consider in our baseline specifications the effect of the economic 
development (as measured by the GDP per capita) and we find that it is associated with 
lower Lerner indices in our preferred models (columns I-III). Thus, it seems that banks in 
countries with lower economic development benefit from higher price-cost margins, a result 
in line with Delis (2012). In online Appendix C1 we report the results from the addition of 
many other structural, institutional, and macroeconomic variables. Our main results on the 
effect of the foreign ownership variables remain unaffected. 
The findings reported in Table 3 and online Appendix C1 are in contrast with the two 
existing studies on this issue (Claessens and Laeven; 2004; Jeon, Olivero, and Wu, 2011) that 
document a negative effect of foreign bank presence on market power measured at the 
country level. In online Appendix C2 we identify the main reason behind this different 
finding. In column I we report the results from a cross-sectional sample (year-averages for 
each country over the period 1997-2004 including the same countries with Claessens and 
Laeven (2004).
11
 We use the same explanatory variables with this study and the same 
estimation method (OLS with robust standard errors). We are indeed able to (almost) exactly 
replicate their results on the foreign bank presence variable both in terms of sign and 
magnitude. Subsequently, we aggregate our Lerner index across the same set of countries and 
years and we find that the results also predict a negative relation between foreign bank 
                                                 
11
 Claessens and Laeven (2004) use data for the period 1994-2001. Given that we do not have data on market 
power prior to 1997, we replicate their findings using the period 1997-2004. 
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presence and market power. Thus, the findings of Claessens and Laeven (2004) are not due to 
the measure of market power. 
Subsequently, in column III we allow the Lerner index to vary at the bank level and 
we use again the countries included by Claessens and Laeven over the period 1997-2004. 
Thus, in this regression the Lerner index is identified at the bank-country-year level as in our 
baseline specification in Table 3. We use the GMM estimator, but the results are robust to the 
use of OLS with bank fixed effects. The results change completely and are in line with those 
of Table 3. Thus, we confirm that the difference in our findings compared to the study of 
Claessens and Laven (2004) is mainly due to the higher dimension of our data.
12
 
Intuitively, the increased foreign bank presence can increase the market power of 
banks for at least three reasons. First, Herrero and Martinez Peria (2007) found that foreign 
banks penetrate those banking sectors with profit opportunities. Usually the old regime of 
these sectors consists of banks with low-quality technology that are relatively cost-inefficient 
or misprice risk (Peek, Rosengren, and Kasirye, 1999). In these situations, foreign banks are 
better able to price risk through their technological advantage, and this leads to higher 
intermediation margins via higher intermediation prices (Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2011). 
Claessens (2006), suggest that this effect is then carried over to the domestic banks, which 
will follow the new pricing schemes because they will, in time, gain access to the new 
technology (i.e., resulting in a technology spillover effect of know-how). Second, foreign 
banks tend to lend to more creditworthy clients. From the demand side, these borrowers 
might be willing to pay higher margins, if they perceive foreign banks as less risky. Third, 
                                                 
12
 We also try to replicate the results by Jeon, Olivero, and Wu (2011). Their H-statistics are unavailable to us 
and thus we use our bank-level estimates of the H-statistic (used in column X of Table 3) to produce country-
year aggregates for the countries and years in their study. However, the foreign bank presence variable is not a 
statistically significant determinant of the thusly constructed H-statistic. We also tried to re-estimate the 
country-year H-statistic parametrically using the methodology described in their study. We find that their non-
linear estimator does not converge in our country-specific samples. Finally, we use the random coefficient 
estimation approach of Swamy (1970) to produce the country-year H-statistics, but again the resulting measure 
is not significantly explained by foreign bank presence. These results are available on request. 
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foreign banks have the ability to offer new banking products compared to domestic banks. 
Thus, they become the monopolists in these products, at least for some time. 
 
4.3. Heterogeneity in the results 
In this section we examine the driving forces of the positive effect on foreign presence on 
banks’ market power, by following the changes in the effects over time, and by 
differentiating between the components of the Lerner index (price vs. marginal cost), the 
mode of foreign bank entry (greenfield vs. M&A), and the period in question (pre- vs. post-
crisis). In most of the analysis, we focus on the effect of foreign presence, which is the only 
foreign-ownership variable that carries a significant coefficient in Table 3. 
First, we follow the changes in the market power of foreign banks over time in a more 
systematic way. We begin by considering the potential heterogeneity in the coefficient on 
foreign presence based on the time (years) since the foreign bank presence reached a specific 
threshold. The rationale for including this variable is that the longer it takes foreign banks to 
dominate in a new market, the more acquainted they become with domestic practices and 
clientele, thereby facing lower informational and agency costs. To this end, we introduce 
interaction terms between the years in which foreign presence reached values equal to 40% 
and 50%, respectively, and we present the estimation results in columns I and II of Table 4. A 
50% threshold naturally captures the presence of a clear majority of foreign-owned banks at 
the country-year level. The 40% threshold exercise then shows what happens as we move 
from a lower (40%) to a higher (50%) decile. 
We find a positive and marginally statistically significant (at the 10% level) 
interaction term in both regressions. Therefore, our findings suggest that the longer a country 
has high levels of foreign bank presence, the higher the positive impact of foreign bank 
presence on banks’ market power. 
 29 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
  
In column III of Table 4 we additionally include the third lag of foreign presence to 
examine how the estimation results evolve over time. This is a test of whether the positive 
effect of foreign presence will fade over time. The results show that this is not the case. The 
first lag used all along in our empirical analysis is the only one that retains a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. We do not include the second lag of foreign presence 
because the results are clearly driven by collinearity (the pairwise correlation coefficient 
between the first and the second lags of foreign presence is equal to 0.99). We also 
experiment with the inclusion of the fourth and the fifth lags, but these estimates are again 
statistically insignificant. In column IV we report the results from the equivalent exercise 
with the foreign-owned variable. The coefficient estimates on all the lags of this variable are 
statistically insignificant. 
We also take one additional step and carry out an event-type analysis to examine the 
timeliness of the effect of the foreign ownership variables. Specifically, in a similar fashion to 
Peristiani (1997), we regress the change in foreign bank ownership in the year following the 
event of foreign bank entry on a dummy variable that takes the value one in the year the 
foreign bank enters the market. We use a treatment effect model, where the dummy variable 
is endogenous and again the entry restrictions for foreign banks is our instrument. The 
results, reported in column V, are equivalent to those of the previous analysis, showing that 
foreign presence is the only significant foreign ownership variable one year after the entry. 
When we use a two-year time window after the event, both the foreign ownership variables 
become insignificant (column VI). The same holds for longer time windows for market 
power. This finding implies that the “spillover effect” is undeniably a short-term effect. 
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Whether this effect truly weakens after the first year of course requires a deeper investigation, 
given that other corporate events might bias the estimates. 
In Table 5 we look at the effect of foreign bank ownership on the separate 
components of the Lerner index. In column I we replicate column I of Table 3, this time 
using the price of bank output as our dependent variable, while in column II we use the 
marginal cost as our dependent variable. We find that the only significant effect (at the 10% 
level) is than of foreign presence on marginal cost. Equivalently, in column III the results 
show that the effect of foreign presence on the Lerner index is due to the increase in the gap 
between the price and marginal cost (i.e., the numerator of the Lerner index). Thus, the main 
mechanism driving the increase in the market power of banks relates to the cost-efficiency 
advantage of the foreign banks, which forces domestic banks to also become more efficient. 
However, this increase in efficiency is not accompanied by a significant reduction in the 
lending rates for the average bank. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
In Table 6 we look into the role of the mode of entry of foreign banks, greenfield or 
through M&As, on the positive nexus between foreign presence and market power. The table 
includes the same set of control variables with column I of Table 3 (and Table 5), but we do 
not include these estimates due to space considerations. Column I reports the results from a 
specification that includes an interaction term between foreign presence and the variable 
named country M&As. This variable equals the number of foreign owned banks that enter in 
the host country through an M&A over the total number of foreign-owned banks, scaled from 
zero to one for expositional brevity. In our sample, two out of three foreign banks enter our 
sample through an M&A. To provide inference at the mean of the main effects, we mean-
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center the variables used to construct interaction terms. The main effect of the foreign 
presence comes out positive and statistically significant as before. The interaction effect is 
also positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that entry through M&As 
is one of the main causal factors of the positive relation between foreign presence and Lerner. 
Thus, greenfield entry of foreign banks, along with an equally capitalized domestic banking 
sector, seems to be the sine qua non to avoid the buildup of market power. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
 In column II of Table 6 we examine how the incumbent domestic banks react to 
foreign bank entry via greenfield or M&As. We find that the results are almost identical with 
those of column I, with the exception that the main effect of foreign presence is statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels. Thus, this regression equation shows that the positive 
effect of foreign presence on incumbent domestic banks only comes from the entry of foreign 
banks through M&As. In this sense, our results are in line with DeYoung, Hasan, and 
Kirchhoff (1998) who find that the cost efficiency of local banks improves in response to 
increased entry in states, which had been allowing out-of-state entry for some considerable 
period of time, as well as with Evanoff and Ors (2008) who receive similar results for a larger 
time frame. In column III we further experiment with the country-year average Lerner index 
by carrying out the same analysis. The result on foreign presence is identical to column I 
while the interaction effect is positive but statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating 
that the foreign bank entry through M&As is the main transition mechanism for the positive 
effect even in country-level regression. 
The main question arising from the exercises of Tables 5 and 6 is whether the higher 
market power of the foreign banks entering through an M&A is price- or efficiency-based. In 
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columns IV to VI of Table 6 we replicate the results of Table 5, using as dependent variable 
the price of bank output, marginal cost and the price-cost margin in columns IV, V and VI, 
respectively when including the interaction term of column I. Again, the results show that 
changes are mainly driven by reductions in the marginal cost due to the increased foreign 
presence of banks entering through M&As (column VI). Also, for a value of country M&As 
equal to this variable’s average (0.72), the derivative d(Marginal cost) / d(Foreign presence) 
equals 0.0027, which is very close to the value of 0.0023 found in column II of Table 5. 
These findings are quite important and have specific implications in relation with the 
existing literature. As in Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005) and Degryse, Havrylchyk, 
Jurzyk, and Kozak (2012), foreign banks mainly acquire domestic banks with high cost 
inefficiency and the new bank, after the M&A, tends to reduce marginal costs, which 
increases the gap between the output price and the marginal cost. Note, however, that there is 
no loss in allocative efficiency in this scenario: bank customers keep paying the same prices, 
total output does not decline, and wealth is transferred from bank suppliers to bank owners. 
Further, we have to keep in mind that there is a reason for the acquisition. Even in 
developed countries, the acquired bank usually is a low-performance institution or a 
government-owned one with no clear profit-maximizing objective (Berger, Clarke, Cull, 
Klapper, and Udell, 2005). In the same vein, a recent strand of the literature (Martinez Peria 
and Mody, 2004) suggests that cross-border M&As in banking are value destructing because 
of the high inefficiency of the acquired domestic banks. The new bank entering through an 
M&A will lower costs, giving rise to higher Lerner indices. In turn, the local-incumbent 
banks react with similar strategies and hence the comparative advantage of the foreign banks 
quickly erodes over time. This scenario is indicative of the insignificant direct effect. In 
contrast, the increased foreign presence tends to increase the overall market power and, 
hence, generates a significant spillover effect. 
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An interesting extension of the empirical analysis is to consider the potential 
structural break in the relation between foreign bank presence and market power caused by 
the financial crisis of 2007. A recent strand of the literature suggests that foreign banks do not 
necessarily enjoy the financial support of their parent institutions during the financial crisis 
(De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2014) or that foreign banks become even more selective in 
directing their lending to financially sounder local firms (Pennathur and Vishwasrao, 2014). 
In columns I and III of Table 7 we report our baseline results for the pre- and post-crises 
periods, respectively (before and after 2007). We find that the coefficients on foreign 
presence are positive and statistically significant in both periods and that the economic 
significance is somewhat higher in the post-crisis period. Thus, the nexus between foreign 
bank presence and market power becomes somewhat stronger after 2007. Again, the main 
source of this finding is foreign bank entry through M&As. This is reflected in the larger 
coefficient of the relevant interaction term in column V (post-crisis period) relative to the 
respective one in column II (pre-crisis period). 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
 We consider various other analyses to examine the heterogeneity in our baseline 
results based on the theoretical considerations discussed in Section 2. First, we examine 
whether our results on the foreign ownership variables change with the level of economic 
development, by either introducing relevant interaction terms of the foreign ownership 
variables or examining each income group separately. The differences in findings are 
negligible Second, we introduce an interaction term between foreign-owned and foreign 
presence. This would allow to see whether the spillover effect is similar across the domestic 
and foreign banks. We find that this interaction term is statistically insignificant, showing that 
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domestic and foreign banks are perfect substitutes in this process. Third, we hypothesize that 
the impact of foreign bank ownership on the market power of banks depends on differences 
in banking-system institutions between the host and the origin country (Mian, 2006). We 
consider difference in (i) restrictions on banks to own non-financial firms, (ii) entry barriers 
on banks, (iii) regulations in terms of the summation of the three previous regulatory 
characteristics, (iv) geographical distance between the capitals of the two countries, (v) 
institutions (information sharing, credit rights and property rights), (vi) culture, (vii) banking-
industry concentration, and (viii) financial-statement transparency. However, we do not find 
robust evidence in favor of these hypotheses. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the impact of foreign bank ownership on the market power of individual 
banks. We collect bank-year data for all countries in the world to estimate the market power 
of banks through the use of the Lerner index. We use a cost function with a semiparametric 
technique that allows for a very flexible specification and does not impose a specific 
functional form on the data. Our method yields observation-specific estimates of the Lerner 
index. 
Subsequently, we match our data set with that of Claessens and van Horen (2014) 
who have information on foreign bank ownership. Thus, our final sample includes 
information for banks from 131 countries over the period 1997-2009. Using this data set we 
examine the impact of the ownership status (foreign or domestic) of individual banks on their 
market power (direct effect), as well as the impact of the share of the number of foreign-
owned banks to the total number banks in the industry (spillover effect). 
We find that the only significant impact comes from the spillover effect and that this 
effect is positive in the sense of a higher bank market power due to an increased foreign bank 
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presence. This effect is mainly transmitted through the considerably higher incidence of 
foreign bank entry through M&As, instead of greenfield entry. We also find that the positive 
impact of the country-level trends in foreign bank presence on banks’ market power is mainly 
driven by a decrease in the marginal cost (a cost-efficiency effect). 
These results have important policy implications for regulators and policy makers 
alike. If increased competition is the requirement, then it seems imperative that foreign bank 
entry is made through greenfield entry. Further, a concomitant abolition of entry barriers is 
warranted. If, in contrast, competition is already rather strong and there are concerns about 
the stability of the banking system, the foreign bank entry through M&As and the 
protectionist policies are preferable to increase the market power of banks and their rents. 
Thus, a natural extension to our work would be to examine the real effects behind the positive 
nexus of foreign bank presence with banks’ market power. In particular, bank market power 
is usually linked to increased lending rates and, thus, to reduced welfare. Yet, a higher market 
power of banks increases bank profitability and can lead to increased financial stability. 
Given our findings, the special role of foreign bank presence in the bank market power-
stability relation needs further examination. We leave this and other issues for future 
research. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
 
Name 
 
Description 
 
Data source 
 
Panel A: Variables used in the analysis of market power 
Earning assets Natural logarithm of deflated total earning assets (measure of a bank’s output). Bankscope 
Price of output Total income divided by total earning assets. Bankscope 
Expenses Natural logarithm of deflated total interest expenses and total noninterest expenses 
(measure of a bank’s total cost). 
Bankscope 
Price of borrowed funds Natural logarithm of total interest expenses divided by total customer deposits and 
short-term funding. 
Bankscope 
Price of labor Natural logarithm of personnel expenses divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Price of physical capital  Natural logarithm of overheads minus personnel expenses divided by fixed assets. Bankscope 
Price of financial capital Natural logarithm of equity divided by total assets Bankscope 
 
Panel B: Variables used in the analysis of market power 
A. Dependent variable 
Lerner index The ability of an individual bank to charge a price above marginal cost. Own calculations 
Average Lerner index The Lerner index averaged by country and year Own calculations 
Adj.-Lerner index Variant of the Lerner index which allows for the possibility that firms do not choose 
the prices and input levels in a profit-maximizing way. 
Own calculations 
Dual-output Lerner Variant of the Lerner index that adopts a dual-output cost function. Own calculations 
H-statistic This is the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic measured by the elasticity of bank 
interest revenues to input prices. The H-statistic is estimated at the bank-year level 
using the same technique with the Lerner indices. Higher values reflect less market 
power. 
Own calculations 
Average H-statistic The H-statistic averaged by country and year Own calculations 
Lerner World Bank The Lerner index by country and year, where marginal cost is estimated with the 
usual parametric techniques and a translog cost function.  
World Bank 
Boone World Bank The elasticity of profits to marginal costs by country and year, where marginal cost is 
estimated with the usual parametric techniques and a translog cost function. 
World Bank 
Price-cost margin The price of output minus the marginal cost Own calculation 
B. Bank characteristics 
Deposits Total customer deposits divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Capitalization Equity capital divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Loans Total loans divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets. Bankscope 
C. Main explanatory variables 
Foreign-owned Dummy variable equal to one if bank is foreign owned (50% or more of their assets) Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Foreign presence The ratio of the number of foreign banks over the number of all banks. Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Foreign presence in terms of 
assets  
The ratio of the assets of foreign banks over the total assets of all banks. Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Country M&As The ratio of the number of foreign-owned banks that enter via M&As over the 
number of foreign-owned banks (scaled from zero to one). 
Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Entry restrictions The index measures the degree to which banks face entry restrictions in the banking 
market and is constructed by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each 
one of the following twelve questions: (1) Is more than one license required (e.g. one 
for each banking activity)? (2) Which of the following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the banking license: (a) draft bylaws (b) intended 
organizational chart (c) financial projections for first three years (d) financial 
information on main potential shareholders (e) background/experience of future board 
directors (f) background/experience of future senior managers (g) source of funds to 
be used as capital. (3) What were the primary reasons for denial of the applications: 
(a) capital amount or quality (b) banking skills (c) reputation (d) other? This index 
takes a value from 0 to 12, with larger values denoting more stringent entry 
restrictions. 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2001, 2004, 2008) and 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou (2012), in the text 
labeled as BCL2008 
Loan-loss provisions Loan-loss provisions divided by total loans  Bankscope 
Private ownership The percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks were used to construct 
rating intervals. Countries with larger shares of privately held deposits received 
higher ratings. 
Economic freedom of the world: 
2012 Annual report 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index of each bank's total earning assets (takes value from 0 to 
1). 
Own calculations 
Activity restrictions The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory 
restrictions on bank participation in: (1) securities activities, (2) insurance activities, 
(3) real estate activities, and (4) bank ownership of non-financial firms. These 
activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited and on this basis the 
variable is assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4, respectively. The index takes a value 
from 0 to 16, with larger values denoting more stringent activity restrictions. 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2001, 2004, 2008) and 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou (2012), in the text 
labeled as BCL2008 
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Capital requirements  This variable is determined: (a) by adding 2, 1, or 0 if the answer is Basel II, Basel I, 
or other; in the question: Which is the regulatory capital adequacy regime?, (b) by 
adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise in the questions: Does the ratio vary 
with market risk? Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities?, (c) by adding 1 if the answer is no and 0 
otherwise in the questions: Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done 
with assets other than cash or government securities? Can initial disbursement of 
capital be done with borrowed funds? This index takes a value from 0 to 6, with 
larger values denoting more stringent capital requirements.  
Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2001, 2004, 2008) and 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou (2012), in the text 
labeled as BCL2008 
Supervisory power  Index of the powers of the supervisor of the banking sector, reflecting whether the 
supervisory agency has the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct 
problems in the banking sector. Takes values from 0 to 14, with higher values 
reflecting more supervisory powers (see Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2008). 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2001, 2004, 2008) and 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou (2012), in the text 
labeled as BCL2008 
Manufacturing The sum of gross output minus the value of intermediate inputs used in the production 
of manufacturing goods. 
World Development Indicators 
Foreign direct investment The net inflow of foreign direct investment. World Development Indicators 
Government spending  The level of government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Heritage Foundation 
Financial freedom Index of banking security and independence from government control. Larger values 
indicate more freedom. 
Heritage Foundation 
Trade freedom A composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect 
imports and exports of goods and services. Larger values indicate more freedom. 
Heritage Foundation 
Ideology The classification rule for the chief executive of each country is as follows: Right (1); 
Center (2); Left (3); No information (NA); No executive (NA). 
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, 
and Walsh (2001) 
Polity The polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Polity IV 
GDP per capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. World Development Indicators 
Years of foreign 
ownership>40% 
The number of consecutive years since when the foreign ownership variable reached 
a value of 40% or higher in a specific country (zero otherwise). 
Own calculations 
Years of foreign 
ownership>50% 
The number of consecutive years since when the foreign ownership variable reached 
a value of 50% or higher in a specific country (zero otherwise). 
Own calculations 
D. Instrumental variable   
Entry restriction for foreign 
banks 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each 
one of the following four questions: Are foreign entities prohibited from entering 
through: (1) Acquisition, (2) Subsidiary, (3) Branch and (4) Joint venture. The index 
takes a value from 0 to 4, with larger values denoting more stringent entry restrictions 
for foreign banks. 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2001, 2004, 2008) and 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou (2012), in the text 
labeled as BCL2008 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Level Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Variables used in the derivation of market power from 1997-2010 
Earning assets Bank 89,514 11.71 2.02 6.83 21.38 
Price of output Bank 89,514 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.71 
Expenses Bank 89,514 8.85 1.93 4.55 18.41 
Price of borrowed funds Bank 89,514 -3.62 0.85 -8.79 0.03 
Price of labor Bank 89,514 -4.30 0.56 -7.18 -2.41 
Price of physical capital Bank 89,514 -0.10 0.92 -2.04 4.04 
Price of financial capital Bank 89,514 -2.50 0.59 -8.40 0.00 
Marginal cost Bank 89,514 0.07 0.06 0.01 1.75 
Panel B: Variables used in the analysis of market power from 1997-2009 
Lerner index Bank 80,506 0.22 0.11 -0.20 0.95 
Lerner index with financial capital Bank 80,557 0.22 0.12 -0.20 0.95 
Adjusted-Lerner index Bank 78,634 0.17 0.12 -0.20 0.95 
Dual-output Lerner index Bank 74,148 0.21 0.20 -11.54 0.95 
H-statistic Bank 81,906 0.23 0.22 -0.56 0.46 
Lerner World Bank Country 81,698 0.21 0.08 -1.61 0.82 
Boone World Bank Country 73,920 -0.05 0.10 -2.08 5.69 
Average price Bank 81,906 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.71 
Marginal cost Bank 81,906 0.07 0.06 0.01 1.75 
Price-cost margin Bank 81,906 0.02 0.02 -1.08 0.41 
Deposits Bank 81,906 0.69 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Capitalization Bank 81,906 0.10 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Loans Bank 81,839 0.61 0.19 0.00 9.36 
Bank size Bank 81,906 12.85 1.66 7.70 21.51 
Loan-loss provisions Bank 79,461 0.01 0.70 -5.70 180.54 
Foreign-owned Bank 81,906 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Country M&As Country 81,906 0.72 0.32 0 1 
Foreign presence Country 81,906 20.60 16.96 0 100 
Foreign presence in terms of assets Country 42,424 18.40 18.54 0 100 
Entry restrictions Country 81,181 7.56 1.96 0 12 
GDP per capita Country 81,864 10.10 0.82 6.10 11.21 
Years of foreign ownership>40% Country 81,906 0.59 2.13 0 13 
Years of foreign ownership>50% Country 81,906 0.39 1.70 0 13 
Private ownership Country 72,596 7.65 2.46 0 10 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index Country 81,906 0.09 0.14 0 1 
Activity restrictions Country 81,215 9.01 2.50 1 16 
Capital requirements Country 81,351 3.53 0.86 0 6 
Supervisory power Country 81,301 11.05 2.27 1 14 
Manufacturing Country 80,350 17.93 4.54 1.82 35.63 
Foreign direct investment Country 81,735 5.63 34.26 -15.03 564.92 
Government spending Country 81,649 50.82 21.00 0 99.30 
Financial freedom Country 81,649 64.18 18.57 10 90 
Trade freedom Country 81,649 77.75 9.93 0 95 
Ideology Country 77,899 1.64 1.07 0 3 
Polity Country 80,325 8.89 3.17 -10 10 
Entry restrictions for foreign banks Country 81,744 0.09 0.33 0 4 
Note: The table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are 
defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3. The impact of foreign bank ownership and foreign bank presence on market power: Baseline regressions 
 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI    
Dependent variable: Lerner Lerner Lerner with 
financial 
capital 
Lerner with 
financial 
capital 
Adj.-Lerner Dual-output 
Lerner 
Average 
Lerner 
Lerner 
World Bank 
Boone 
World Bank 
H-statistic Average H-
statistic 
Lagged dependent 0.467*** 0.376** 0.508*** 0.490*** 0.607*** 0.275*** 0.367*** -0.361 0.314*** 0.362*** 0.717*** 
 (3.042) (1.989) (3.713) (3.503) (6.075) (4.038) (3.688) (-1.425) (4.758) (6.262) (7.464)    
Deposits -0.225 -0.332 -0.266 -0.291 -0.341* -0.182 -0.408* -0.349** -0.030 0.259** 0.028    
 (-1.160) (-1.264) (-1.334) (-1.370) (-1.796) (-0.682) (-1.862) (-2.122) (-0.285) (2.086) (0.269)    
Capitalization 0.977*** 1.073**   0.907*** 1.209*** 0.340** 0.565 0.048 0.120 0.129    
 (3.900) (2.438)   (4.020) (4.405) (2.232) (0.916) (0.387) (0.506) (0.819)    
Loans 0.031 0.144 0.030 0.003 -0.032 0.061 -0.155 0.068 -0.210* -0.184 -0.107    
 (0.176) (0.779) (0.147) (0.017) (-0.149) (0.371) (-1.283) (0.151) (-1.683) (-1.367) (-1.088)    
Bank size 0.043 0.067 0.018 0.015 0.017 0.067** 0.031 0.008 -0.050** -0.058 -0.022    
 (1.488) (0.811) (0.461) (0.412) (0.641) (2.420) (1.183) (0.113) (-2.106) (-1.069) (-0.552)    
Foreign-owned -0.230 0.049 -0.251 -0.249 -0.208 0.099 0.074 -0.107 -0.131 0.755* 0.267    
 (-1.005) (0.193) (-1.031) (-0.977) (-1.019) (0.640) (0.498) (-0.288) (-0.474) (1.771) (1.244)    
Foreign presence 0.009**  0.010** 0.010** 0.007** 0.005** 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.004* 0.001 0.001    
 (2.506)  (2.431) (2.482) (2.138) (2.267) (3.088) (3.629) (1.954) (0.210) (0.526)    
Foreign presence in 
terms of assets  
 0.003***          
 (2.617)          
Entry restrictions 0.014*** 0.045 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.007** 0.009*** 0.026** -0.001 -0.003 -0.002    
 (5.956) (1.513) (6.182) (5.856) (4.018) (2.286) (3.031) (2.569) (-0.193) (-0.718) (-0.948)    
GDP per capita -0.297** -0.255 -0.322* -0.282 -0.146 -0.045 -0.097 -0.044 0.256 -0.011 0.138    
 (-2.149) (-0.546) (-1.747) (-1.575) (-0.997) (-0.272) (-0.680) (-0.164) (1.196) (-0.037) (0.613)    
Observations 49,776 25,837 49,830 49,769 47,125 55,855 51,216 61,653 55,613 51,173 51,217 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen (overall) 0.329 0.143 0.297 0.289 0.284 0.516 0.423 0.447 0.637 0.809 0.749 
Hansen (IV style) 0.229 0.440 0.120 0.264 0.616 0.452 0.426 0.136 0.595 0.762 0.306 
AR1 0.003 0.035 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.988 0.599 0.912 0.994 0.538 0.324 0.107 0.924 0.247 0.202 0.815 
Note: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The total sample consists of 131 countries and spans the time period 1997-2009. Column I shows our baseline results, 
where we use the simple Lerner index. The following columns confirm the results of our baseline regression when using alternative measures of foreign ownership (Column II) or competition 
proxies (III-XI). The dependent variable in column III is the Lerner index with financial capital, in IV the Lerner index with financial capital when we include country fixed effects in the 
estimation of marginal cost, in V the adjusted-Lerner index, in VI the Lerner index obtained from the dual-output cost function, in VII the average Lerner index by country and year, in VIII 
the Lerner index of the World Bank by country and year, in IX the Boone indicator from the World Bank by country and year, in X the H-statistic and in XI is the average H-statistic by 
country and year. The variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM estimator for dynamic panels and robust standard errors are 
clustered by country. Also, all regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which shows the joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is 
the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p-values of 
the tests for the first- and- second-order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include GMM-style instruments (lags) and the entry restriction for foreign banks (ERFBt-1) as an IV-style 
instrument. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 48 
Table 4. Foreign bank presence and market power: Evolution of the effect over time 
 I II III IV V VI    
Heterogeneous 
effect due to: 
Years of 
foreign 
ownership>40
% 
Years of 
foreign 
ownership>50
% 
Evolution of the 
effect of foreign 
presence 
Evolution of the 
effect of foreign-
owned 
Treatment 
effect( 1 
year) 
Treatment 
effect( 2 
year) 
Lagged dependent 0.470*** 0.456*** 0.452*** 0.468***                 
 (3.760) (3.070) (4.153) (3.686)                 
Deposits -0.231 -0.256* -0.109 -0.119 0.034*** 0.065*** 
 (-1.450) (-1.766) (-0.647) (-0.586) (6.377) (8.800)    
Capitalization 0.803*** 0.800*** 1.019*** 1.098*** -0.078*** -0.112*** 
 (3.368) (3.523) (4.355) (4.626) (-6.250) (-6.485)    
Loans 0.078 0.041 0.220* 0.188 0.028*** 0.034*** 
 (0.588) (0.290) (1.660) (1.310) (6.665) (6.129)    
Bank size 0.057*** 0.046** 0.049 0.044 0.008*** 0.006*** 
 (2.598) (2.116) (1.244) (0.922) (4.778) (2.672)    
Foreign-owned -0.270 -0.234 -0.435* -0.389 0.070 0.180 
 (-1.372) (-1.143) (-1.877) (-1.452) (0.50) (1.20) 
Foreign-owned (t-3)    -0.060                 
    (-0.247)                 
Foreign presence 0.005** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.011** 0.001*** 0.000    
 (2.255) (2.726) (2.599) (2.316) (4.434) (0.854)    
Foreign presence (t-3)  -0.003                  
   (-1.105)                  
Entry restrictions 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 
 (6.957) (7.513) (5.042) (5.222) (7.805) (18.918)    
GDP per capita -0.290* -0.261 -0.418*** -0.440*** -0.083*** -0.238*** 
 (-1.754) (-1.549) (-3.020) (-2.865) (-6.145) (-12.464)    
Years of foreign 
ownership 
-0.036* -0.040                   
 (-1.669) (-1.521)                   
Foreign presence * 
Years of foreign 
ownership 
0.001* 0.001*                   
(1.855) (1.736)                   
Observations 49,733 49,733 41,037 41,037 60,728 51,107 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen (overall) 0.859 0.977 0.260 0.158                 
Hansen (IV style) 0.834 0.946 0.282 0.151   
AR1 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001                 
AR2 0.948 0.913 0.272 0.659                 
Note: This table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the Lerner index. The variables 
are defined in Table 1. Columns I-IV are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM for dynamic panels and robust 
standard errors clustered by country. Columns V-VI are estimated with treatment effects model. Also, all regressions include 
year-fixed effects. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which shows the joint statistical significance of the coefficient 
estimates. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to 
accept the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-order 
autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include the entry restriction for foreign banks (ERFB t-1) as an IV-style instrument. 
Columns I-IV include GMM-style instruments (lags). The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Foreign bank presence and subcomponents of the Lerner index 
 I II III    
Dependent variable: Price Marginal Cost Price-cost margin 
Lagged dependent 0.495*** 0.743*** 0.464*** 
 (4.37) (5.170) (7.791)    
Deposits 0.175 -0.013 -0.082**  
 (1.330) (-0.24) (-2.137)    
Capitalization 0.341* -0.060 0.241*** 
 (0.206) (-0.540) (5.603)    
Loans -0.141 -0.151 -0.038    
 (-1.680) (-1.620) (-1.268)    
Bank size -0.054 -0.022 0.002    
 (-1.510) (-1.050) (0.434)    
Foreign-owned 0.200 0.153 0.024    
 (0.990) (1.140) (0.794)    
Foreign presence 0.001 -0.002* 0.002**  
 (0.780) (-1.730) (2.476)    
Entry restrictions -0.007* 0.007 -0.014***   
 (-1.777) (-1.440) (-3.273)    
GDP per capita 0.372 0.426* -0.011    
 (1.260) (1.65) (-0.444)    
Observations 51,173 61,740 51,173 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen (overall)  0.306 0.456 0.665 
Hansen (IV style) 0.302 0.422 0.105 
AR1 0.002 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.765 0.385 0.157 
Note: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in column I 
is the average price of bank activities (P), in II the marginal cost (MC), and in III the price-cost margin 
(the difference between price and marginal cost). The variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions 
are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors 
clustered by country. Also, all regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is the p-value of the Wald 
test, which shows the joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is the p-value of 
the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null 
(valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-
order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include GMM-style instruments (lags) and the entry 
restriction for foreign banks (ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Foreign bank presence and market power: The mode of foreign bank entry 
 I II III IV V VI 
Dependent variable: Lerner Lerner Average 
Lerner 
Price Marginal 
cost 
Price-cost 
Margin 
Lagged dependent 0.450*** 0.447*** 0.399*** 0.636*** 0.663*** 0.474*** 
 (3.489) (3.283)    (3.271) (5.930) (4.430) (8.469) 
Foreign-owned -0.326 -0.046    0.016 0.218 0.080 0.010 
 (-1.166) (-1.201)    (0.087) (0.960) (0.790) (0.313) 
Foreign presence 0.008** 0.005    0.008** 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (2.196) (1.267)    (2.305) (-0.350) (-1.010) (1.217) 
Country M&As 0.057 0.061    0.049 0.073 -0.004 0.008 
 (0.891) (0.912)    (0.865) (0.930) (-0.200) (1.111) 
Foreign presence * Country 
M&As 
0.010** 0.011**  0.010* 0.003 -0.001* 0.001** 
(2.101) (2.145)    (1.909) (0.870) (-1.750) (2.555) 
Observations 49,776 46,842 51,216 51,173 61,740 51,173 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen (overall) 0.134 0.276 0.497 0.447 0.364 0.471 
Hansen (IV style) 0.468 0.296 0.300 0.416 0.428 0.265 
AR1 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.607 0.528 0.726 0.971 0.630 0.212 
Bank characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in columns I-II is 
the Lerner index, in III the average Lerner index, in III the average price of bank activities (P), in IV the 
marginal cost (MC), and in V the price-cost margin (the difference between price and marginal cost). The 
variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM for 
dynamic panels and robust standard errors clustered by country. Also, all regressions include year-fixed 
effects and the control variables included in Table 3. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which shows the 
joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at 
the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-order autocorrelation, 
respectively. All equations include GMM-style instruments (lags) and the entry restriction for foreign banks 
(ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Foreign bank presence and market power: The effect of the crisis 
 I II III IV    
Threshold: Pre-crisis Pre-crisis 
type of entry 
Post-crisis Post-crisis 
type of entry 
Lagged dependent 0.451*** 0.391** 0.413 0.388*** 
 (4.927) (2.523) -1.322 (5.265)    
Foreign-owned 0.283 0.087 -0.260 -0.115    
 (0.881) (0.290) (-0.880) (-0.407)    
Foreign presence 0.010** 0.011** 0.011** 0.009**  
 (2.190) (1.967) -1.998 (2.103)    
Country M&As  0.024  0.140*   
  (0.568)  (1.924)    
Foreign presence * Country M&As  0.009**  0.014**  
  (2.074)   (2.250)    
Observations 27,916 27,916 21,860 24,641 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen (overall) 0.779 0.706 0.544 0.878 
Hansen (IV style) 0.695 0.560 0.669 0.558 
AR1 0.000 0.012 0.143 0.000 
AR2 0.331 0.222 0.919 0.061 
Bank characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the Lerner 
index. In columns I-II we limit our sample to the pre-2007 period and in columns III-IV to the post-2007 
period. The variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with the two-step “difference” 
GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors clustered by country. Also, all regressions include year-
fixed effects and the control variables included in Table 3. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which shows 
the joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at 
the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-order autocorrelation, 
respectively. All equations include GMM-style instruments (lags) and the entry restriction for foreign banks 
(ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of the average Lerner indices by year 
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Figure 2 
Foreign bank presence and banks’ market power 
 
 
 
